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 France’s Renewed Reaction to the “Islamic Headscarf”:   
The Role of the Republican Model of Citizenship in Shaping French  
Public Responses to New Social Actors 
 
Elaine R. Thomas  
 
 
The French National Assembly on February 11, 2004 approved a new law prohibiting 
students from wearing “ostensible” religious symbols in the nation’s public schools.  While 
formally applicable to signs of all religions—headscarves, yarmulkes, and crosses “of a clearly 
excessive dimension” will all be banned—the law is clearly being passed mainly in response to 
concerns about Muslim students wearing headscarves.  The proposed law was drawn, selectively, 
from the recommendations of a special investigatory commission appointed by Jacques Chirac in 
July 2003 to investigate “the application of the principle of secularism (laïcité) in the Republic” 
and led by immigration expert Bernard Stasi.  The widely publicized conclusions of this 
Commission sought to harness laïcité’s broad public legitimacy to the project of developing a 
new shared consensus about how best to integrate France’s sizable, and increasingly visible, 
Muslim religious minority.1  In reality, however, the new law provoked a national public debate 
of rare intensity, one that has visibly divided France’s leading pro-secularist organizations, 
political parties, and other major political groupings. 2  
Both the intensity of controversy surrounding the headscarf issue and the new law itself 
have astonished many observers outside of France, not only in the United States and Arab 
countries, but even within the rest of Europe.3  What accounts for the peculiar excitement 
                                                
1 France’s Muslim population, Europe’s largest, is estimated at approximately 5 million.  Wholly reliable 
figures are lacking, however, since France prohibits collecting of data on religion.  A 1994 survey by Le 
Monde found that 27% of Muslims in France were “believing and practicing.” (Christopher Caldwell, 
“The Crescent and the Tricolor,” The Atlantic On-line [November 2000], 
http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2000/11/caldwell.htm). 
2 « La loi sur le voile à l’école divise le camp laïque, » Le Monde, Jan. 17, 2004; « Voile, croix, kippa, 
turban : du consensus à la confusion, » Le Temps, Jan. 24, 2004. 
3 “Les medias arabes, unanimes, condamnent ‘l’intégrisme laïque’ français, » Le Monde, Dec. 11, 2003; 
Jérome Cordelier, « Reproches ostentatoires, » Le Point, Jan. 2, 2004; « Les petits camarades de Ferry lui 
bottent les fesses, » Libération, Jan. 23, 2004; « Sous la laïcité, les traditions chrétiennes, » Le Temps 
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surrounding this question in France and the determination of the French government, supported 
by a clear majority of the French public opinion 4 and many French intellectuals from across the 
political spectrum, to pass such controversial and restrictive new legislation on this issue?   
In reality, this question can be seen as having two rather different faces.  The first face of 
the question has to do with the apparent disparity between cause and effect, with the fact that 
(mere) headscarves have provoked such a seemingly disproportionate reaction in France.  
Students can readily be found wearing headscarves to school in the US, Canada, Britain, and 
other many countries where they generally pass almost without notice, their relative novelty and a 
non-Muslim majority population notwithstanding.  To explain France’s adoption of its surprising 
new law, one must therefore first explain why the headscarves issue has proven so peculiarly 
sensitive in France, regularly occasioned such public furor since its first emergence in 1989, and 
now commanded the attention of a prestigious national commission of experts.  In responding to 
this first face of the question, an appreciation of French understandings of citizenship and laïcité 
and the particularities of French history and tradition associated with those concepts is essential. 
There is also a second face of the question, however, which has to do with why, now, this 
law was adopted.  The new law marks a break in existing French policy, and cannot be accounted 
for by reference to long-term continuities of French political tradition alone.  In order to 
understand the departure marked by this law, as opposed to France’s ongoing interest in the 
headscarf issue, one needs to look more closely at the changing social, legal, and international 
political context within which the Stasi Commission was appointed and how that changing 
context contributed to shaping its decisions.  Among the most important factors that need to be 
noted in this regard are practical difficulties associated with earlier policy responses; an effective 
mobilization of public sympathy by new feminist groups organizing within the disadvantaged 
neighborhoods where many Muslim women in France live; concern about the rise of anti-
Semitism and the spill-over of conflicts in the Middle East into French public schools; and, 
paradoxically, developments in international human rights law. 
                                                                                                                                                         
(Geneva), Dec. 18, 2003; Dominique Vidal, « Exception française, » Le Monde Diplomatique, no. 599 
(Feb. 2004): 6-7. 
4 Surveys of CSA, Ifop, and BVA found anywhere from 57% to 72% in favor.  Catherine Coroller, 
“L’opinion publique plutôt pour un législation, » Libération, Dec. 8, 2003.  
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The Peculiar Intensity of the Headscarf Issue in France  
France has reacted like no other country of immigration to the presence of “Islamic” 
headscarves in its public schools.  According official French sources, a total of 1,256 foulards 
were reported as being worn in France’s public schools at the start of the 2003-2004 school year.  
Only twenty of these cases were judged “difficult,” even  by school officials themselves, and only 
four students were expelled. 5  Considering that France’s Muslim population is currently estimated 
at 4-5 million and is predominantly young, French public reaction to the problem of students in 
headscarves appears strikingly disproportionate.   
France’s peculiar and seemingly overblown reaction to this issue has been significantly 
shaped by France’s republican tradition of thinking about citizenship, its relationship to 
membership in social and religious groups, and most importantly secularism or laïcité.  The terms 
of public “common sense” on these issues in France form a peculiar political cultural backdrop 
against which the headscarves issue has repeatedly emerged as a major, and fiercely debated, 
issue. 
 
Citizenship and Group Membership 
Among French proponents of the law, citizenship is commonly exalted as a realization of  
individuality. For supporters, this individuality of the citizen is further equated with emancipation 
of the individual as a rational agent from groups seeking control of their members though force or 
superstition.6  A telling passage of the Commission’s report, rightly highlighted by Pierre 
Birnbaum, thus declares: 
L’État laïque, garant de la liberté de conscience, outre la liberté de culte ou 
d’expression, protège l’individu; il permet librement à tous de choisir, ou non, une 
option spirituelle ou religieuse, d’en changer ou d’y renoncer.  Il s’assure qu’aucun 
                                                
5 Philippe Bernard, “Foulard à l’école: la réalité cachée derrière les chiffres officiels, » Le Monde, Dec. 10, 
2003. 
6 In the words of Commission member Ghislaine Hudson, “Le fait de demander que l’école soit un milieu 
protégé des influences religieuses et politique, parce que c’est un lieu de formation d`esprit, ne vise pas a 
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groupe, aucune communauté ne peut imposer a quiconque une appartenance ou une 
identité confessionelle, en particulière en raison de ses origines.7 
 
Many proponents of the new law point to growing numbers of girls in “Islamic veils” as evidence 
of sexual oppression and rising religious and traditional pressures on Muslim young women in 
France.  Some influential French feminist critics have recently likened these pressures to those 
forcing women to wear the veil in Iran or other parts of the world. 8      
Among the new law’s critics, by contrast, one finds those seeking to articulate an 
understanding of citizenship more compatible with individuality as expressed in and through 
membership in particular social and religious groups.  Demonstrations against the new law 
organized by the small, extremist Parti des musulmans de France (PMF) and joined at the last 
minute by one of France’s largest Muslim organizations, the Union des organisations islamistes 
de France (UOIF), have clearly sought to appeal to this alternative view of individuality in 
relation to group membership.  Marches in Paris and provincial cities, which assembled 5,000-
10,000 participants, featured slogans such as “Ni frère, ni mari, le foulard on l’a choisi” and “le 
voile c’est mon choix.”9  It could be argued that these demonstrations were unrepresentative of 
the views of France’s Muslim population.  According to recent surveys, 81% of Muslim women 
in France never wear headscarves outdoors.10  Of 300 women from Muslim families interviewed 
in November, 49% actually favored a law against visible religious and political symbols in the 
                                                                                                                                                         
exclure mais à s`intégrer et donc à s’émanciper. » « Laïcité : loi nécessaire ou dangereuse, » Le Monde, 
Dec. 11, 2003.   
7 Commission de Réflexion sur l’Application du Principe de Laïcité dans la République (2003).  Rapport 
au Président de la République, p. 14. 
http://lesrapports.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/BRP/034000725/0000.pdf. Here my analysis closely 
follows that of Pierre Birnbaum, “Une vision forte de la citoyenneté,” Liberation, Dec. 13, 2003. 
8 For instance, see the widely cited pamphlet of Iranian feminist Chahdortt Djavann, Bas les voiles!  
(Paris: Gallimard, 2003). 
9 Agence France Presse, Jan. 18, 2004; « Le demi-echec des extremistes musulmans, » Le Temps, Jan. 19, 
2004; « Laïcité. Ces musulmans qui disent non à la loi, » Le Telegramme, Jan. 18, 2004. 
10 Results reported in Elle, Dec. 15, 2003.  Also see the very diverse reactions to the proposed law on the 
part of Muslim women questioned  in “`Si cèst ca, je ne me sense plus francaise,’” Libération, Dec. 18, 
2003. 
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schools, while only 43% opposed it. 11  Nonetheless, the message sent by these protests attests 
tellingly to the savvy of even relatively “fundamentalist” Muslim groups in France in 
understanding, and frontally challenging, the underlying theoretical premises about citizenship, 
individuality and (religious) group membership shaping the positions of their republican 
adversaries.   
Interestingly, however, the message of these new social actors actually shared significant 
common ground with that of their opponents.  Both camps present the individual as a “choosing 
agent” external to, and thus capable of choosing, even its closest social, cultural, and religious 
ties.  Neither side has championed the more communitarian position of Michael Sandel, sceptical 
for his part of the very possibility of the individual as an agent of choice fully external to his or 
her “constitutive attachments.”12  Still, this shared ground has by no means resolved the debate 
given widely differing views of why, whether and at what age girls may be “freely choosing” to 
don their headscarves. 
 
Laïcité, and its Explanatory Limits 
The French concept of laïcité and the peculiar historical tradition associated with it are 
also undeniably key to understanding the peculiar intensity of this debate in France.  The peculiar 
bearing of secularism as understood by many French supporters of laïcité on rights to freedom of 
public religious expression is particularly important in this regard.  The liberal tradition of 
separation of church and state as now it now exists in the US historically developed largely to 
protect religion from the state, to ensure the state’s neutrality and protect each individual in his or 
her faith from undue state pressure or interference.  Ideas of state neutrality and freedom of 
religion are thus key to what secularlism is understood to be about in the liberal tradition.   
By contrast, the French republican conception of laïcité developed primarily in reaction to 
the traditional political power of the Catholic Church.  Thus, whereas Americans sought to 
protect religion from the state, France’s combat for laïcité sought to free the state from undue 
                                                
11 Ifop survey conducted November 21-29, 2003.  Ifop, « Les femmes musulmanes en France, » 
http://www.ifop.com/europe/sondages/opinionf/musulmane.asp.  
12 Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1982), pp. 175-83. 
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religious influence.  The historical circumstances that contributed to forming the notion of laïcité 
as it developed in France gave the notion of secularism a different emphasis there.  That 
republican emphasis continues to significantly mark the instinctive reactions of the French public 
today to issues concerning the place of religion in the public sphere and, above all, within those 
institutions charged with the formation of citizens.  In its report, the Stasi Commission thus 
clearly distinguished the meaning and entailments of laïcité from other (more liberal) notions of 
separation of church and state, explaining :   
 Dans la conception française, la laïcité n’est pas un simple ‘garde frontière’  qui se 
limiterait à faire respecter la séparation entre l’État et les cultes, entre la politique et 
la sphère spirituelle ou religieuse.  L’État permet la consolidation des valeurs 
communes qui fondent le lien social dans notre pays. 13   
 
As presented by the Commission, this understanding of laïcité is in turn closely tied to the 
republican view of citizenship’s relation to group membership.  The Commission thus presented 
defense of laïcité as grounds for setting limits to citizens’ expression of “difference,” and even to 
cultural and religious identification itself.   The Commission argued: 
  …l’exacerbation de l’identité culturelle ne saurait s’ériger en fanatisme de la 
différence, porteuse d’oppression et d’exclusion.  Chacun doit pouvoir, dans une 
société laïque, prendre de la distance par rapport à la tradition.  Il n’y a là aucun 
reniement de soi mais un mouvement individuel de liberté permettant de se définir par 
rapport à ses références culturelles et spirituelles sans y être assujetti.  
 
In another particularly striking passage, just after remarking that “la laïcité peut permettre le 
plein épanouissement intellectuel de la pensée islamique à l’abri des contraintes du pouvoir, » 
the report continues :  
Par-delà le status des cultes, l’exigence laïque demande aussi à chacun un effort sur 
soi.  Le citoyen conquiert par la laïcité la protection de sa liberté de conscience; en 
contrepartie, il doit respecter l’espace public que tous peuvent partager.  Revendiquer 
                                                
13Commission, op. cit., p. 15. 
  
DOCUMENT DE TRAVAIL DE LA Chaire MCD – 2004-04 
Chaire de Recherche du Canada en Mondialisation, Citoyenneté et Démocratie 
http://www.chaire-mcd.ca/ 
 
 9 
la neutralité de l’État semble peu conciliable avec l’affichage d’un prosélytisme 
agressif, particulièrement dans l’espace scolaire.  Accepter d’adapter l’expression 
publique de ses particularités confessionelles et de mettre des bornes à l’affirmation 
de son identité permet la rencontre de tous dans l’espace public.14 
 
In contrast with this tradition, in Britain, Sweden and other European countries with recognized 
state churches, separation of church and state was never so clearly established.  Such historical 
differences have no doubt also contributed to the sometimes puzzled reactions of other European 
states to France’s recent discussions.15  As comparatively oriented scholars have rightly 
emphasized, these diverse historical traditions continue to play an important role in shaping 
political choices related to the recognition of religious differences in the public sphere.  These 
questions are once again becoming current as Europe’s Muslim population grows and becomes 
more settled. 16   
The particularities of France’s historically constituted tradition of laïcité  alone cannot 
explain the country’s recent striking decision to legally restrict the wearing of religious signs, 
however.  Were that the case, such legislation should already have been passed in response to 
France’s first national controversy concerning headscarves, the “affaire du foulard” of 1989.  In 
reality, however, that affaire led to a very different, more decentralized, case-by-case approach to 
addressing the issue.  That approach is now being rejected in favor of a stricter, national-level 
rule.   
Also tellingly, the present law is by no means unanimously supported by all of France’s 
leading organizations widely known for their “pro-secular” orientation. 
For instance, France’s Ligue des droits de l’homme (LDH), Ligue de l’enseignement, Mouvement 
contre le racisme et pour l’amité entre les peuples (MRAP), and Fédération des conseils de 
parents d’élèves (FCPE) all opposed the measure.  Thus, like French feminists, the teachers’ 
syndicates, and France’s major political parties, the laïque camp itself was quite divided 
                                                
14Ibid., p. 16. 
15 Vidal, op cit. 
16 J. Christopher Soper and Joel Fetzer, "Explaining the Accommodation of Muslim Religious Practices in 
France, Britain, and Germany”,  French Politics 1 (2003): 39-59. 
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internally by the issue.17  Also remarkably, Jean Bauberot, a leading French expert on laïcité 
serving on the Stasi Commission, abstained from endorsing that body’s final recommendations.  
Prevailing French understandings of laïcité thus cannot alone account for the recent change in 
policy. 
 
Why France’s Approach to Headscarves is Changing 
The new law actually marks a clear departure from France’s existing approach to the 
headscarves issue.  Such a decided change cannot be explained solely in terms of the French 
republican tradition of laïcité.  The republican tradition has not changed since the first “affaire du 
foulard” began in 1989.  Why then did the Stasi Commission opt to recommend a departure from 
standing policy and practice on this issue?   
Answering this question requires one to look beyond French understandings of citizenship 
and laïcité and other constant features of the French republican model.  To understand the 
departure marked by recent developments, it is also essential to look at practical considerations, 
social and legal developments, and changes in beliefs about the facts of the situation facing local 
French educational officials.  These more contextual factors are essential to explaining France’s 
new resolve to legislate against headscarves.    
 
The Alternative, Case-by-case Approach 
For the last fifteen years, French policy regarding headscarves was based on the 1989 
opinion of the Conseil d’État.  It is that policy which the new law replaces.  In contrast to the new 
law against wearing religious signs, the policy framed by the 1989 Conseil d’État decision was 
one of qualified laissez-faire.  The Conseil d’État had underscored students’ rights to freedom of 
religion and religious expression, including through the wearing of religious signs.  These rights 
could be abrogated only where overridden by other considerations.  The Conseil d’État decision 
allowed for school officials to prevent a student from wearing her headscarf only if and where 
required by the schools’ obligation to prohibit “les actes de pression, de provocation, de 
                                                
17 Pierre Tevanian, « Une loi antilaïque, antiféministe et antisociale, » Le Monde Diplomatique no. 599 
(Feb. 2004) : 8;  « La loi sur le voile à l’école divise le camp laïque, » Le Monde , Jan. 17, 2004; « Voile , 
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prosélytisme, ou de propagande,” to ensure safety and security, to prevent “toute perturbation du 
déroulement des activités d’enseignement, du rôle éducatif des enseignants et tout trouble 
apporté à l’ordre dans l’établissement,” and to ensure that students duly followed their required 
courses of study.18  This policy clearly left generous room for discretion by local school officials 
and permitted expulsion of several students who refused to remove their head scarves.  However, 
this approach did not deny students’ rights to wear headscarves on grounds of their conflicting 
with the principle of laïcité.   
By contrast, what the Stasi Commission’s report initiated was a new legal delimitation of 
freedom of religious expression based explicitly on upholding the French tradition of laïcité.  
This marked a clear break with previous reasoning, a break that can only be explained by 
reference to developments in the practical, social, and legal context that contributed to shaping 
the Commission’s reasoning and the policy that followed from it.   
 
Dissatisfaction with Existing Policy 
In 2004, the 1989 Conseil d’État decision still had a number of supporters.  Intellectuals 
often praised the decision for duly recognizing the inherent multiplicity of symbols’ potential 
meanings and effects.  Some also praised it for delegating authority to the local level, and for 
promoting constructive negotiation and discussion between local educational authorities, parents, 
and students. 19   
Despite its long list of considerations that could, in principle, trump students’ rights to 
religious expression, the 1989 decision did not grant headscarf opponents very much.  In practice, 
very few reported cases of the wearing of a headscarf could be shown to cause any of the specific 
                                                                                                                                                         
croix, kippa, turban : du consensus à la confusion, » Le Temps, Jan. 24, 2004. 
18 Commission, op. cit., pp. 29-30; « L’avis du Conseil d’État de 1989, seule référence en matière de 
droit, » Le Monde, Dec. 10, 2003. 
19 See for example Monique Canto-Sperber et Paul Ricoeur, « Une laïcité d’exclusion est le meilleur 
ennemi de l’égalité », Le Monde, Dec. 10, 2003; Anthony Giddens, « Voile islamique  : la France sur la 
mauvaise voie, » Le Monde, Jan. 14, 2004.  Daniel Amson, « Les raisons qui militent contre; Pourquoi 
légiferer sur le voile? », Le Figaro, Dec. 19, 2003; et les propos de philosophe Chantal Delsol rapportés 
dans Le Figaro, Dec. 23, 2003.  Commission member Jean Bauberot, expert on laïcité, abstained from 
endorsing the body’s final recommendations which he judged to allow too little “space for interpretation” 
in contrast to the 1989 Conseil d’État approach which he favored.  Le Monde, Dec. 11, 2003.   
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problems mentioned.  The Conseil d’État decision kept school officials’ reaction to headscarves 
within bounds, forcing teachers and administrators to show that particular headscarves really did 
pose unresolvable problems before expelling students wearing them.   
Many teachers and school administrators were clearly dissatisfied with this approach.  In a 
variety of ways, it posed practical difficulties for them.  Although decision-making was delegated 
to the local level, schools were not allowed to pass stricter local rules of their own that simply 
prohibited headscarves from being worn.  French courts repeatedly ruled that such blanket 
prohibitions, which many schools tried to pass in the interest of clarity and simplicity, were 
contrary to the 1989 Conseil d’État decision. 20  Any punishment of a student for wearing a 
headscarf thus had to be justified on a case-by-case basis.  Some principals resented the way this 
requirement forced them to play the “bad cop” vis-à-vis particular students and their families.  
Nor did they relish having to make the highly contestable case-by-case judgment calls that the 
1989 Conseil d’État ruling required. 21  Indeed, a number of local administrators’ decisions made 
within that framework were legally challenged, with decisions sometimes overturned in court.22   
The 1989 framework allowed expulsions of students wearing headscarves on the basis of 
generous loopholes.  It therefore gave principals grounds for making expulsions, and also gave 
expelled students and their families grounds for legal recourse.  Repeated lawsuits were a 
predictable consequence.  Not surprisingly, this proved an approach with which the very school 
officials to whom the ruling sought to devolve greater authority were largely dissatisfied. 23 
The Stasi Commission was, by its own account, particularly moved by testimony solicited 
from teachers and administrators.  Three-quarters of the Commission’s members had themselves 
served as professors, teachers, or school administrators.  In favor of a stricter and clearer 
                                                
20 Rapport de la Commission Stasi, p. 30; « L’avis du Conseil d’État de 1989, seule référence en matiè re 
de droit, » Le Monde, Dec. 10, 2003. 
21 See Sept. 9, 2003 testimony.  Public Senat, « Louise Arvaud, Principal du collège Beaumarchais Paris 
11è,» 
http://www.publicsenat.fr/dossiers/open_video_special_laicite.asp?video=20030909_01&player=windows
&debit=bas (consulted 6/4/04.) 
22  « L’avis du Conseil d’État de 1989, seule référence en matière de droit, » Le Monde, Dec. 10, 2003. 
23 While the syndicates within the UNSA were quite divided on whether to support the law, the syndicates 
representing school principals and school inspectors (SNPDEN and SIEN) voted in favor.  Le Monde, Jan. 
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approach, the Commission stressed the need to support public teachers and school principals 
abandoned by the state in difficult local situations that they often faced great difficulty in 
managing on their own.24  As Commission member Patrick Weil explained after the 
Commission’s report was issued,  « Nous avons senti qu’elle [l’institution scolaire] était 
dépassée, qu’elle ne maîtrisait pas la situation.  Cela nous a incités à agir. »25  This idea was 
quickly echoed by Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin who expressed hope that the law would 
help to « protéger les fonctionnaires qui se sentent fragiles ».26   
 
Pro-Christian Prejudice Thinly Veiled? 
In order to understand support for the new law beyond the circles of school administrators 
and members of the Commission sympathetic to their concerns, however, one needs to look at 
two other important reasons for widespread political dissatisfaction with the  previous “qualifed 
laissez faire” approach to the wearing of headscarves and other religious signs.  Dissatisfaction 
with the existing policy and desire for a stricter and simpler legal approach to restricting 
headscarves extended well beyond the ranks of school directors, and it seems unlikely that a 
majority of the French public rallied behind the new law in the interest of helping school 
principals avoid legal challenges.   
One might very well ask, however, whether French public support for the law was not 
guided, more simply, by widespread hostility toward the country’s Muslim minority.  It would 
doubtless be rather naïve to think that negative attitudes regarding Muslims and resentment 
against the departure from tradition that the growing public presence of a Muslim minority in 
France represents played no role in generating support for the new law.  
Indeed, many have derided the new law as an attack on Muslim thinly disguised as an 
even-handed prohibition of religious signs in general. 27  Large crosses, as critics quickly pointed 
                                                                                                                                                         
17, 2004.  A survey of French teachers later found some three-quarters of them also in support of it.  See 
CSA survey reported in Le Monde, Feb. 5, 2004. 
24Commission, op. cit., pp. 40-44.   
25 « Des ‘sages’ eux aussi déchirés, » Liberation, Dec. 13, 2003. 
26 cité dans Le Monde, Dec. 16, 2003. 
27 For example, see Xavier Ternesien, « La manque d’audace du rapport Stasi envers l’Islam, » Le Monde, 
Dec. 16, 2003; « Sous la laïcité, les traditions chrétiennes, » Le Temps, Dec. 18, 2003. 
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out, are not particularly in vogue, and wearing a cross is not a religious obligation.  One might 
therefore be tempted to argue that the French were really just seeking a way to permit only 
typical symbols of Christian identity (such as small crosses), thus selectively protecting France’s 
Christian minority without admitting it.   
 Clever though this may seem, this reading does not square very well with the actual 
pattern of support and opposition that developed.  Catholic, Protestant, and Orthodox church 
officials all criticized the proposed law for being anti-religious and warned Chirac against passing 
it.28  Nor was the law supported by the far-Right National Front, which preferred to see 
Christianity’s privileged position in France upheld much more overtly. When the new law was 
proposed, FN leader Jean-Marie Le Pen denounced it as an effort to delude the public into 
focusing on the veil while ignoring the “real” problem:  “massive immigration”.29  Similarly, an 
editorial in the FN weekly National Hebdo argued : 
 La solution de ce problème réside dans l’assimilation de ceux qui acceptant de 
s’assimiler et dans le retour au pays de ceux qui ne le veulent pas.  Légiférer sur le 
voile à l’école, c’est légiférer sur l’accessoire, c’est prendre une mesure qui ne peut 
rien résoudre, mais seulement exacerber les conflits et se retourner contre les 
Français fidèles à la religion de leur père… .30    
.   
The Headscarf as a Symbol of Women’s Submission 
Although France’s new radical right FN party, which opposed the law, did not play much 
direct role in mobilizing public support for it, the work of new feminist groups did.  To make 
sense of this pattern, one needs to understand how French observers have come to “read” the 
headscarf.  Unlike political t-shirts, headscarves do not come inscribed with words specifying the 
messages they are intended to convey.   Such messages are thus imputed to them by those who see 
or imagine the garment, and patterns of interpretation are culturally variable.  This situation 
generates considerable potential for cross-cultural misunderstandings.  American and French 
observers, for example, tend to “read” the scarf as a sign conveying very different messages.   
                                                
28 “Soixante femmes célèbres s’opposent au voile islamique,” Le Temps, Dec. 9, 2003. 
29 Christophe Forcari, “Pour le Front National, un voile égale un vote, » Libération, Dec. 5, 2003. 
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Americans often imagine a student attending class with her hair covered as someone 
willingly engaged in a freely chosen expression of her religious identity or cultural tradition, or as 
guided by personal modesty.  Americans thus often imagine the headscarf as a t-shirt reading, “I 
believe in Allah,” or “I’m proud to be a Muslim!”  Why, they wonder, would the French prohibit 
such declarations of piety and cultural pride?   
By contrast, when the French picture such a student, they more often tend to imagine her 
as an unwilling victim of sexist familial or community pressures.  For many French observers, a 
headscarf looks more like a t-shirt that says, “I’m just a girl, and I know my place,” or “Don’t hit 
me!  I accept my submission.”  Deciphering the message that way, they are more indignant at the 
idea of girls being forced to wear such signs.   
Who is right?  The available evidence fortunately allows us to go beyond such 
generalizations as the fact that signs have multiple meanings, or that all signs may be subject to 
discrepancies between the message emitted and the one received.  On the basis of interviews 
conducted with French wearers of the clothes in question, we can fairly reach some conclusions 
about why they are worn and what they mean.  In reality, it is fairly clear that there are both 
students in France wearing headscarves as a matter of personal religious conviction and  those 
who do not want to wear headscarves but are forced to do so by familial or community 
pressure.31 
It is the fact of female students being forced to wear signs read as saying, “I’m just a girl 
and I know my place” that particularly galls many people in France.  In contrast to its position in 
1989, the French Conseil d’État in early 2004 expressed its support for a law prohibiting such 
signs.  Explaining this change of position, members of the Conseil d’État characterized sexually 
inegalitarian community pressures on girls as a factor marking a significant change from the 
situation in 1989.32   
                                                                                                                                                         
30 Quoted in Olivier Pognon, “Le parti juge que l’affaire du voile loi profite,” Le Figaro, Dec. 26, 2003. 
31 See especially Françoise Gaspard et Farhad Khosrokhavar, Le foulard et le république (Paris: 
Découverte, 1995).  It is unfortunately impossible on the basis of this work to put any percentages to these 
different possibilities; for that, a more representative study with a larger sample would be required. 
32Olivier Pognon, “Après l’avis favourable du Conseil d’État,” Le Figaro, Jan. 28, 2004. 
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It is difficult to say whether such pressures at the local level really have increased.  
Evidence suggesting they have is largely anecdoctal.  The phenomenon of parents pressuring 
their daughters to wear the foulard was also widely noted back in 1989.  However, there was little 
or no discussion then of the role of community pressure and intimidation by other students, or 
local gang leaders, in pushing girls to dress this way.  Since 1989, the terms of the French 
national discussion of the issue have clearly changed.   
In particular, the issues of sexism and unwanted community pressures on girls to wear 
head coverings allegedly expressing acceptance of a subordinate and submissive social role has 
grown significantly.  As the Commission’s report noted, the 1989 Conseil d’État decision made 
no reference to questions of sexual equality. 33  Concerns regarding sexual equality were raised in 
1989, but the issue has since assumed a much more central role in French discussion of the 
headscarves issue.  The greater salience of such arguments in 2003-2004 reflected the effective 
mobilization of French public sympathy by groups representing “les filles de banlieue” or “les 
femmes des cites” during and just prior to the latest wave of French debate on the headscarves.   
The activities of the organization  Ni putes, Ni soumises (NPNS) and the network of local 
associations associated with it were especially important in this respect.  On October 4, 2002, 
Sohane Benziane, an adolescent from the public housing projects of Vitry-sur-Seine was burned 
alive in a cellar, a victim of local male aggression.  Reports of this horrifying incident played an 
important role in heightening public attention to violence against women in France’s poor 
neighborhoods.  A few weeks later, a movement calling itself “Ni putes, Ni soumises” (“Neither 
Whores Nor Submissives”) was launched.  The launching of NPNS also roughly coincided with 
publication of NPNS leader Samira Bellil’s widely read autobiography, Dans l’enfer des 
tournantes,34 a hard-hitting account years of gang rape and abuse at the hands of certain 
oppressive male youth of the district where she grew up.  NPNS soon won considerable media 
attention.  In its first year, the group organized numerous conferences and debates and undertook 
                                                
33 Commission, op. cit., p. 29. 
34 (Paris: Éditions Denoël, 2002).  Bellil’s book was released on October 9, just five days after the murder 
of Sohane Benziane.  On Bellil’s role in NPNS, see Mouedden op. cit. 
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a vast consciousness raising campaign. 35  In February to March 2003, NPNS mobilized 10,000-
30,000 participants for a march across France “contre les ghettoes et pour l’égalité”, departing 
(symbolically) from Vitry-sur-Seine.36  NPNS leaders were then invited in March 2003 to meet 
with Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin, who embraced NPNS demands that congruent with the 
united right UMP’s own emphasis on security. 37  Leaders from NPNS were also invited to 
present their testimony to the Stasi Commission. 
The message conveyed by NPNS has been highly critical of traditional Islam, machismo, 
and sexist family and community pressures to which many young women of France’s immigrant 
suburbs are subject.38  Calling for a “generat ional struggle,” the movement has decried such 
pressures as impeding the emancipation of France’s “women from below.”  The recent rise of this 
movement has drawn public attention to divisions within “immigrant” groups in France, 
particularly tensions between more conservative elements and feminists sharply critical of 
tradition.   
Given this context, the French public has become acutely aware that the veil, or even the 
headscarf, is far from being consensually accepted within France’s Muslim population.  Cases of 
girls forced to wear foulards or veils by community pressure, threats, or intimidation have been 
widely publicized.  Just before the Stasi Commission’s report was released, the popular magazine 
Elle published an open letter by sixty well-known women, Muslim and non-Muslim, calling on 
Chirac to ban the veil.  Elle’s publication of this letter also contributed rising public awareness of 
sharp divisions among Muslims themselves in France. 
For its part, the Commission heard from not only representatives NPNS but also from 
several other French feminists militantly opposed to the veil, including Chahdortt Djavann, the 
                                                
35 Mohsin Mouedden, « Le mouvement «`Ni P…, Ni Soumises’ sert-il la cause des femmes? » Jan. 9, 
2004 http:// saphirnet.info/imprimer.php?id=938, (consulted 2/23/2004); Maryelle Budry, “Ni putes, ni 
soumises,le mouvement féministe qui monte,” Solidarités  no. 39 (Jan. 19, 2004) : 5, 
http://www.solidarites.ch/journal/print.php?id=1223 (consulted 2/24/04). 
36 See Amara, Fadela, “Le Tour de France Républicain,” www.niputesnisoumises.com/html/index.htm 
(consulted 2/24/2004). 
37 Clarisse Fabre and Mathilde Mathieu, “Le gouvernement veut améliorer le quotidien des femmes d’en 
bas , » Le Monde, Mar. 10, 2003. 
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French-Iranian author of Bas les voiles! (Down with the Veils!).  By contrast, though they were 
the main group targeted by the Commission’s recommendations, only two students actually 
wearing veils were invited to testify.  Nor were other feminists opposed to the new prohibition 
granted the same attention.  As one commission member later noted, an atmosphere developed 
that made it almost impossible to defend the right to wear headscarves without the strong risk of 
being taken for a “sexist” reactionary.39  This pattern of organizational activity, popular 
mobilization and media coverage have thus played a key role in shaping French public 
perceptions of “the veil” and of the constraints leading some girls to wear it.  While France’s 
paternalistic response to this perceived situation may be misguided, it is not at all surprising in 
this context that public demands for state intervention to “save” girls from veiling have arisen.   
 
Fighting Anti-Semitism by Fighting the Headscarf 
 Finally, a last important, if less initially obvious, factor behind the government’s current 
efforts to renew and reinvigorate laïcité  has been European and French concern about rising anti-
Semitism.  Members of the Stasi Commission reported being particularly shocked on the last day 
of hearings by the testimony of a group of 200 high school students, one of whom remarked that 
a Jewish student wearing a yarmulke to the student’s school would be immediately “lynched.”  
While perhaps sensational by intent, this comment was not contradicted or qualified by other 
students present.  A school director in the 11th arrondissement of Paris and a parent’s letter she 
read for the record also testified to an atmosphere in which Jewish students actually feared being 
identified lest they be physically attacked by other students.40   
This evidence culled from the Commission’s own hearings was reinforced by research 
and findings from other sources.  A draft report on anti-Semitism recently prepared for the 
                                                                                                                                                         
38 For example, see Macite femmes, “Le Manifeste des femmes des quartiers,” http:// 
www.macite.net/home/article.php3?id_article=29 (consulted 2/24/04); Macite femmes, « À l’origine du 
mouvement, » http://www.macite.net/home/artic le.php3?id_article=19 (consulted 2/24/04).    
39Jean Bauberot, « Les mutations actuelles de la laïcité en France au miroir de la Commission Stasi, » 
paper presented at 72nd Congress of Acfas, Montréal, Québec, May 10-14, 2004. 
40 Sept. 9, 2003 testimony of Louise Arvaud.  
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European Commission also reported abundant evidence of such problems in France.41  The report 
linked a recent upsurge in anti-Semitic violence, peaking in mid-2002 in France and other 
European countries, to resurgence of the Israel-Palestinian conflict.  Its authors also attributed 
responsibility for many attacks to “Muslim youth”, supporting the hypothesis of a partial turn in 
France from an anti-Semitism originating in organized far-right groups to a new “banlieue” 
variety of anti-Semitism.  These aspects of the report proved highly controversial and even led to 
a disclaimer on the part of the European Commission.  They are, however, suggestive of a new 
beliefs about the roots on anti-Semitism that have recently been gaining public currency in 
France and elsewhere.  The findings of the Stasi Commission itself, reports in the media, and a 
recent book edited by French sociologist Emmanuel Brenner also attested to an alarming spill-
over of the Israel-Palestinian conflict within French public schools where anti-Jewish insults and 
physical abuse of Jewish students by their peers has been reported. 42   
 
 One might well ask, however, how and why rising concern about anti-Semitism would 
translate into a new proposed legal restriction on the wearing of religious signs in the schools, 
especially given that “ostensible” Jewish signs are also prohibited.  First, one needs to bear the 
numbers in mind.  Estimated at 550,000-700,000, France’s Jewish population is the largest in 
Europe, and the third largest in the world.  However, French Jews are still outnumbered by 
French Muslims by approximately 10 to 1.  Should conflict along lines of religious identification 
erupt, as some evidence suggests may already be occurring in some instances, Jewish students 
would be the main victims.  For their safety and welfare, it is therefore important to keep violent 
hostility between Jews and Muslims out of the French schools, something local school authorities 
have thus far apparently not fully succeeded in achieving.  
                                                
41 Werner Bergmann and Juliane Wetzel, “Manifestations of anti-Semitism in the European Union, First 
Semester 2002, Synthesis Report on behalf of the European Monitoring Center on Racism and 
Xenophobia,”  (Vienna: March 2003 ): 62-9.  
http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasite/images/iht_daily/D281103/eu_anti_semitism_report.rtf.  Consulted 
6/4/04. 
42Emmanuel Brenner, ed., Les territoires perdus de la république.  Antisémitisme, racisme et sexisme en 
milieu scolaire (Paris :  Mille et une nuits, 2002); Thomas Fuller, « Anti-Semitism infuses scarf debate, » 
International Herald Tribune, Feb. 10, 2004. 
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 While such concerns appear to be warranted, the prevailing terms of discussion in France 
encourage a (false) symbolic equation between fighting potentially violent manifestations of anti-
Semitism and fighting headscarves.  Stasi Commission member Alain Touraine’s explanation of 
his ultimate support of the Commission’s recommendations was particularly revealing in this 
respect.  Touraine’s support for the Commission’s report surprised some because he was initially 
opposed to the idea of new legislation and is well-known for defending the potential positive 
effects of a modernizing Islam. Justifying his apparent change of position to Le Monde, Touraine 
explained : 
depuis l’intifada, la France est devenue un pays communautariste…Il n’est pas juste 
de dire que j’ai changé d’avis, c’est profondément la France qui a changé : dans les 
lycées, on est juif ou on est arabe, on ne s’identifie plus par sa classe sociale ni même 
par les vêtements de marque que les parents ont pu vous payer, mais par le religion.43   
 
This way of framing the problem produces a symbolic equation between the problem of student 
rancor against Jews and the headscarf issue in several ways.  First, the problem is understood as 
one of putting one’s religious identity first, and of division along religious lines.  This concern is 
captured in the notion of “communautarisme,” a touchstone of recent French discussion.  In the 
letter introducing its findings, the Stasi Commission’s report also warned of “le risque d’une 
dérive vers le communautarisme.”44  “Communautarisme” was judged to be a danger, the sort of 
thing toward which one may “dérive” by virtue of the assumption that, once divided into different 
firmly defined groups with mutually exclusive identities, groups will be prone to conflict.  The 
linking of this development to the spill-over of the Intifada in French public schools reinforces 
this association, despite the fact that one could argue that it is in this case the (external) conflict 
that fuels the mutually exclusive pattern of identification rather than the reverse.  There is some 
truth in the French view, however, in that the identification of the French Jewish and Muslim 
                                                
43Philippe Bernard, «Membre de la commission Stasi, Alain Touraine raconte sa conversion au principe 
d'une loi, »  Le Monde, Dec. 18, 2003. 
44 Bernard Stasi, « Lettre de Mission au Président de la République, » July 3, 2003.  This letter 
immediately precedes the main text of the Commission’s report. 
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students with their Middle Eastern counterparts is evidently a sina qua non for replaying the 
international conflict on a reduced scale in French school yards. 
 How is the banning of religious signs, and particularly headscarves relevant here?  There 
is a symbolic parallel between the two cases.  Both are attempts to prevent students from bringing 
overt expression of religiously based identities associated with conflicts in the larger world into 
the schools.  Symbolically, both are also about fighting what is seen as a dangerous entry of 
Oriental, Middle Eastern, or Arab issues and identities into French schools.  Finally, and most 
problematically, banning headscarves equates to fighting violent anti-Semitism in the schools in 
that both are about ensuring a symbolic submission of “young Muslims” to “the law,” or about 
preventing “illegal, religiously-based behavior” by Muslim students in schools.   
The questionable element of this parallel consists in the fact that for “the law” to be 
defended against the “excessive expression of Muslim religious identity” in the case of 
headscarves, a law must first be enacted to defend!  Bizarrely, pursuing this strategy leads to the 
need to create a law to (staunchly) defend.  No matter that, in contrast to attacks on Jewish 
students, the behavior strictly banned (i.e, wearing a headscarf) is not demonstrably harmful to 
others.  For the headscarf ban to enact a symbolic solution to the problem of violent anti-
Semitism, what is essential is, simply, that the law set limits to the expression of (dangerous and 
divisive) religious and social identities in the schools.   
The proceedings of Licra’s congress in January meeting, to which Interior Minister 
Nicolas Sarkozy was invited, also showed this pattern of thinking.  The meeting was largely 
devoted to highlighting anti-Semitism’s troubling recent rise in France and its changing character.  
Anti-Semitism, participants learned, was no longer mainly a problem coming from traditional 
racists on the far-right; instead it increasingly stemmed from the situation in the Middle East.45  
At this same meeting, Licra’s president, Patrick Gaubert, staked out a clear position in favor of 
the new rule prohibiting religious signs.  Sarkozy, in turn, stressed his commitment to 
aggressively fighting anti-Semitism, noting a series of recent prosecutions.  Also mentioning the 
new law, the minister stressed the need to remind everyone that the rules were the same for all; 
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Muslims were not above the law. 46  The influence of this pattern of reasoning helps to explain the 
course of recent French decision making, which in many ways follows logically from widespread 
implicit assumptions in France about the nature and causes of ethnic and religious conflict.  This 
way of seeing the problem is deeply embedded in some of the key terms widely used to discuss 
such issues in France, terms such as “communautarisme.”  
 
The European Court of Human Rights 
One might well ask why the rising influence of international and European human rights 
law did not prevent France from passing its unusual new restrictions on the right to freedom of 
religious expression.  In reality, the authority of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) 
did influence the Stasi Commission’s reasoning and conclusions, but not as one might have 
expected.  The Commission was keenly aware that any new French legislation needed to be able 
to pass eventual scrutiny by ECHR.  The Commission’s official report therefore discussed 
relevant precedents and how a French law prohibiting headscarves in public schools could be 
made to satisfy the European court’s standards.  In its report, the Commission noted that the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms protects religious liberty, 
but that this right is not absolute.  Moreover, the Commission noted, the approach of ECHR to 
interpreting this requirement has involved « une reconnaissance des traditions de chaque pays, 
sans chercher à imposer un modèle uniforme de relations entre l’Église et l’État. »47   
Notably, one of the recent precedents identified by the Commission as relevant in this 
respect was the court’s February 13, 2003 decision on the case Refah Partisi [Prosperity Party] 
and Others v. Turkey.  This case challenged the Turkish government’s banning of the Islamic 
Prosperity Party.  ECHR decided in favor of the Turkish government in this case, ruling that the 
party’s political project posed dangers to the rights and liberties guaranteed by the Turkish 
constitution, including that of laïcité.  In other words, where laïcité is constitutionally 
                                                                                                                                                         
45 Note that this analysis again attests to the current political influence of the causal claims advanced in the 
draft report on anti-Semitism, despite the European Commission’s official disclaimers regarding those 
conclusions. 
46Xavier Ternisien, “Au congrès de la Licra, » Le Monde, Jan. 27, 2004. 
47 Commission, op. cit., p. 21. 
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guaranteed—as it also is in France—ECHR was, this precedent suggested, willing to allow state 
measures to defend laïcité, even if they contravened other basic liberties. 48   
Is it a coincidence that the Commission’s own recommendation of a new law banning the 
wearing of “ostensible” religious signs in the public schools was set forth in the context of a 
report on the French tradition of laïcité and the conditions for its continued application in France 
today?  Awareness of the ECHR and the need to satisfy its standards thus helps explain why 
defense of the new law prohibiting headscarves and other religious signs centered to such an 
extent on reference to the principle of laïcité, despite the fact that France’s tradition of laïcité 
actually does not by itself account for the recent change in policy.   Paradoxically, the ECHR’s 
influence did not lead to a more liberal policy.  On the contrary, raising objections about the 
wearing of headscarves to a level of principle sufficient to satisfy ECHR standards took 
regulations restricting headscarves off the relatively pragmatic terrain  that the 1989 Conseil 
d’État decision had insisted upon in 1989.  Recognition of the authority of ECHR has thus 
contributed in practice to reinforcing the more inflammatory and divisive symbolic dimensions of 
the headscarves issue related to France’s secular republican tradition. 
 
 In short, French assumptions about the nature of citizenship and its relation to group 
membership and the peculiar historical tradition of laïcité in France are undoubtedly essential for 
understanding why the wearing of headscarves or other religious signs in the nation’s schools has 
repeatedly emerged as such a hot issue.  Nonetheless, one must to look beyond the republican 
model itself to explain why the French decided to adopt a new law.  The new law marks a clear 
departure from previous French practice.  To understand this development, one therefore has be 
look beyond French traditions of citizenship and laïcité to a series of more practical and 
circumstantial factors that have contributed to shaping French perceptions of the issue.  Practical 
problems with the existing approach, the recent effective mobilization of public sympathy by 
feminist groups representing “les filles des banlieus ,” concern regarding the recent rise of anti-
                                                
48 Ibid.  
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Semitism in France, and recent precedents in international human rights law all must be taken 
into account if one wishes to understand this controversial recent change in French policy.   
 
Conclusion 
 The recent French decision on headscarves is in many ways more rational than many 
foreign observers have assumed, but the decision is nonetheless risky.  The new law aims to 
promote integration and bolster social consensus regarding the terms on which France’s ethnic 
and religious minorities of postwar immigrant origin are to be integrated.  However, it runs the 
risk of producing effects directly opposed to those intended.  Whether the policy will effectively 
promote integration or, on the contrary, further entrench emerging divisions between 
“communities” depends in large part on how Muslims in France will react to the new law.  An 
outspoken minority has, predictably, emerged in clear opposition.  More surprisingly perhaps, 
other segments of French Muslim opinion have proven much more sympathetic to the 
government’s strategy.   
Still in question are many moderate Muslims who are not particularly committed to 
wearing headscarves themselves but who may see France’s latest “scarf hunt” as evidence of a 
certain public, officially sanctioned, “islamophobia.”  Publicity regarding the law’s purpose and 
rationale, beginning with the report of the Stasi Commission itself, has aimed to discourage such 
a reading.  By contrast, some of France’s more radical new Islamic organizations such as the 
Strasbourg-based Parti des musulmans de France and the Union des organisations islamistes de 
France have sought to encourage it.  Will already relatively secular and moderate French 
Muslims be encouraged to pursue a course of continued secularization by the new law adopted in 
the name of laïcité?  Or will the latest “scarf hunt” alienate such citizens and turn them toward 
radical organizations seeking to interpellate them as outcast victims?  Will such radical 
organizations’ followings swell, and will they gain greater sway within the French Council for 
the Muslim Religion (CFCM) recently constituted by the French government to represent the 
French “Muslim” population as a whole?  Recent debates over the proposed law have already 
occasioned struggle between the UOIF and more quiescent elements within the CFCM.  Will 
reception of the recent debate and the new regulations contribute to tipping the existing balance 
in a more radical direction? 
  
DOCUMENT DE TRAVAIL DE LA Chaire MCD – 2004-04 
Chaire de Recherche du Canada en Mondialisation, Citoyenneté et Démocratie 
http://www.chaire-mcd.ca/ 
 
 25 
As self-conscious organization of France’s Muslim minority proceeds and new groups 
claiming to represent it develop greater ability publicly to voice their perspectives and to diffuse 
alternative message to their existing and potential members, the French mainstream media and 
French intellectuals are likely to lose some of their former ability to set the terms of national 
debate, and thus to control the “spin” to which measures like the new ban on religious signs are 
subject.  At the same time, other countries appear to be much more closely attuned to France’s 
handling of its diversity issues than they were a few years ago, and they have been much quicker 
to comment on French decisions in this area than they were during the first headscarves debate.  
Paradoxically perhaps, so far neither of these changes has led to any liberalization of French 
policy.  Instead, it has taken a somewhat more restrictive  turn.  Even the widely noted influence 
of the European Court of Human Rights does not for now prevent France from pursuing its 
distinctive national policy course in this area.  If anything, it has pushed the most conflictual, 
symbolic dimensions of the is sue to the forefront.  These underlying domestic and international 
changes do, however, promise to make France’s handling of its diversity issues ever more 
challenging.   
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